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ORIGINAL ARTICLE1
2 Distributed cognition at the crime scene
3 Chris Baber
4 Received: 18 January 2009 / Accepted: 20 December 2009
5  Springer-Verlag London Limited 2010
6 Abstract The examination of a scene of crime provides
7 both an interesting case study and analogy for consider-
8 ation of Distributed Cognition. In this paper, Distribution is
9 defined by the number of agents involved in the criminal
10 justice process, and in terms of the relationship between a
11 Crime Scene Examiner and the environment being
12 searched.
13
14 1 Introduction
15 The examination of a crime scene is subject to all manner
16 of legal, ethical and scientific imperatives, and the evidence
17 collected will be subjected to inspection by a variety of
18 individuals with different intentions, skills and knowledge.
19 In this paper, I will suggest that Crime Scene Examination
20 presents an interesting and challenging domain in which to
21 consider the notion of Distributed Cognition for the simple
22 reason that it is not always apparent where the act of
23 ‘cognition’ is situated. The ultimate aim of the criminal
24 justice process, of course, is to acquire evidence which can
25 be combined with information from other sources in order
26 to produce a case that can be tried in Court. Contrary to its
27 representation in popular fiction, the examination of a
28 crime scene is unlikely to yield evidence that immediately
29 links a suspect to a crime. Rather, the collection of evi-
30 dence is part of a complex web of investigation that
31 involves many individuals, each considering different
32 forms of information in different ways. Thus, the paper
33begins with a cursory description of the role of the Crime
34Scene Examiner (CSE) within the criminal justice process.
35The CSE is part of a much larger investigative system,
36each member of which has their own skills and roles
37(Smith et al. 2008). In a sense, Crime Scene Investigation
38involves sets of ad-hoc teams pursuing independent goals
39with quite limited overlap (Smith et al. 2008). Thus, there
40is typically a demarcation between roles. Having said this,
41the nature of this demarcation has been subject to signifi-
42cant shifting over the years, with the ongoing digitisation
43of Crime Scene Examination leading to further changes.
44For example, there used to be a specific role of Crime
45Scene Photographer whose function was to capture and
46process images of the crime scene (either prior to evidence
47recovery or at stages during the recovery process,
48depending on the nature of the crime). However, with the
49growing use of digital cameras by CSEs, this role has (in
50some Police Forces) changed. This has the interesting
51implication that the function of a photograph taken by the
52Crime Scene Photographer was to capture the scene as
53clearly as possible in order to aid discussion of the scene in
54Court (or during subsequent investigation), but the function
55of a photograph taken by the CSE could be to illustrate the
56evidence recovery process; I suggest this because the
57capturing of images by the CSE is part of the activity being
58undertaken rather than the sole focus of the activity.
59Whether or not similar changes might arise in terms of
60specialised analysis of fingerprints, footwear marks, DNA
61and other evidence is a matter of continued debate. For the
62time being, these analyses are generally performed by
63Forensic scientists rather than by CSEs. This means that
64one of the primary roles of the CSE is the recovery of
65evidence and its transportation in a usable state to the
66laboratory of the Forensic scientist. How this recovery and
67transportation is performed, and how closely the Forensic
A1 C. Baber (&)
A2 Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering,
A3 The University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
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68 scientist and CSE cooperate depends very much on the
69 nature of the crime being examined. For much of our work,
70 we have focused on what is called ‘Volume Crime’ (e.g.,
71 robbery, burglary), as opposed to ‘Serious Crime’ (e.g.,
72 murder, rape, kidnapping). In Volume Crime, it is likely
73 that the recovered evidence is passed onto the Forensic
74 Scientist via a third party (sometimes called the ‘Evidence
75 Manager’). This means that any information pertaining to
76 that item needs to be carefully and comprehensively
77 recorded by the CSE prior to depositing with the Evidence
78 Manager. It is this combined process of recovery, storing,
79 labelling and transportation of evidence that forms the
80 basis of several forms of computer-based CSE support (i.e.,
81 evidence management systems). Before exploring this
82 further, we consider the archetypal detective and his
83 approach to investigating crimes.
84 2 Sherlock Holmes and reasoning about crime
85 Sherlock Holmes tells a visiting stranger ‘‘You have come
86 up from the South–West I see’’ observing that the ‘‘…clay
87 and chalk mixture which I see upon your toes caps is quite
88 distinctive.’’ (Doyle 1989, p. 176, The five orange pips).
89 This ability to draw correct conclusions from visual evi-
90 dence is one of the hallmarks of Holmes’s powers, and
91 implies a particular form of reasoning. Holmes’s method is
92 a form of induction which involves the careful observation
93 of the environment in order to develop hypotheses and then
94 performing a process of elimination among a number of
95 alternative possibilities, that is, ‘‘…eliminate all other
96 factors, and what remains must be the truth.’’ (Doyle 1989,
97 p. 66, The sign of four). So that, ‘‘one simply knocks out all
98 the central inferences and presents one’s audience with the
99 starting-point and the conclusion, [so that] one may pro-
100 duce a startling, though possibly a meretricious, effect.’’
101 (Doyle 1989, p. 583, The adventure of the dancing men).
102 He would often present his conclusions as the result of
103 deduction (i.e., ‘Elementary, my dear Watson’) and imply
104 that he was able to draw a conclusion from general prin-
105 ciples to a specific observation; indeed, Holmes would
106 often refer to his method as deduction. One could argue
107 that Holmes was attempting to apply a deductive method
108 (through his exposition of premises) but was hampered by
109 Doyle’s insistence of continuing to add extra pieces of
110 evidence, which forced him into an inductive method.
111 This distinction between induction and deduction is
112 based on a broad characterisation of the approaches as rival
113 positions, namely induction as ‘observations leading to
114 theory’, and deduction as ‘theory guiding observation’. In
115 reality it can be difficult to separate the two, and difficult to
116 conceive of the ‘pure’ application of induction (which
117 would involve the compiling of observations in a manner
118which was theoretically agnostic, and the subsequent
119development of a theory which was solely based on those
120observations). One would assume that observations will be,
121in some sense, selective and that this selectivity could be
122tuned by attention to specific aspects of the environment.
123The point of this discussion is to raise a key issue for Crime
124Scene Examination; there is a supposition that the work of
125the CSE involves the ‘harvesting’ of materials which
126would then be analysed by Forensic Scientists. CSEs are
127supposed to maintain neutrality in terms of collecting
128evidence and to conduct their work in an inductive manner,
129because any sense in which they are interpreting the scene
130could be construed as a potential for bias in the investi-
131gation. Of course, Holmes never had to face such accusa-
132tions because, as a literary character, he was not guilty of
133bias (only of revealing the information given to him by his
134author) and did not have to justify his interpretations under
135cross-examination in Court. The question of how Crime
136Scene Examination treads the line between induction and
137deduction is explored later in this paper; before this we will
138consider the notions of Distributed Cognition that underlie
139our studies.
1403 Distributed cognition
141The notion that cognition can be ‘distributed’ has been
142developed over the past couple of decades (Artman and
143Waern 1999; Artman and Garbis 1998; Busby 2001; Flor
144and Hutchins 1991; Furness and Blandford 2006; Hollan
145et al. 2002; Hutchins 1995a, b; Hutchins and Klausen 1998;
146Perry 2003; Rogers and Scaife 1997). While I suggest that
147Crime Scene Examination necessarily involves several
148agents performing cognitive activity, this is not to argue
149that this results in an ‘extended mind’ across these agents;
150as Dror and Harnand (2009) point out, to argue for an
151extended mind is analogous to arguing for extended
152migraine–just because an event occurs in one brain does
153not inevitably mean that other brains will share this event.
154Dror and Harnand’s (2009) argument is that one should not
155separate cognitive states from mental states. This criticism
156raises a core problem for the notion of ‘Distributed Cog-
157nition’, because it implies that cognition cannot be ‘dis-
158tributed’ across agents because one cannot share mental
159states. A primary assumption of ‘Distributed Cognition’ is
160that it is not ‘cognition’ which is distributed so much as
161objects-in-the-world, which plays a role in supporting,
162structuring and aiding the activities of cognition. ‘‘A main
163point of departure from the traditional cognitive science
164framework is that, at the ‘work setting’ level of analysis,
165the distributed cognition approach aims to show how
166intelligent processes in human activity transcend the
167boundaries of the individual actor. Hence, instead of
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168 focusing on human activity in terms of processes acting
169 upon representations inside an individual actor’s heads the
170 method seeks to apply the same cognitive concepts, but this
171 time, to the interactions among a number of human actors
172 and technological devices for a given activity.’’ (Rogers
173 1997, p. 2). This quotation hints at two notions of an
174 ‘extended mind’. For example, some theorists claim that
175 the mind can become ‘extended’ through its interactions
176 with the environment, for example ‘‘…certain forms of
177 human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback,
178 feed-forward and feed-around loops; loops that promiscu-
179 ously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world.’’
180 (Clark 2008, p. xxviii). Thus, as we shall in the section
181 entitled ‘Inspection and Examination’, objects-in-the-world
182 (and the representations made of them) form resources-for-
183 action through their ability to afford specific responses. In
184 addition, the crime scene examination process also features
185 a distribution of tasks. What is particularly interesting,
186 from the point of view of Distributed Cognition, is that the
187 process of ‘find–recover–analyse–interpret–conclude’ is
188 divided between two or more people, with quite limited
189 communication between them. The CSE might perform the
190 ‘find-recover’ tasks to gather potential evidence and then
191 submit this for the ‘analyse–interpret’ tasks by a Forensic
192 Scientist, who would then pass the results onto the Officer
193 in Charge of the case with a probability to guide the pre-
194 liminary ‘conclude’ tasks. The Officer in Charge would
195 then combine this evidence with other information to raise
196 a hypothesis and add this to a Case file which would be
197 passed to the Crown Prosecution Service. This hypothesis,
198 if maintained, would then be tested in Court by Barristers
199 presenting a case for and against an individual.
1 Each step
200 of this process would be documented and conclusions
201 drawn in such a way as to avoid potential bias.
202 One could draw an analogy between ‘extended mind’
203 and the debate over ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ mental content in
204 Philosophy. The notion of ‘narrow’ content might assume
205 that a person’s belief about something could be defined
206 entirely by their intrinsic characteristics (and would not
207 change with any changes in their environment). The notion
208 of ‘broad’ content, on the other hand, is inextricably tied to
209 the person’s environment. For example, Putnam (1975)
210 contrasted beliefs about the concept ‘water’ between Earth
211 and ‘Twin Earth’. Twin Earth was exactly the same as
212 Earth, with the exception that the chemical properties of
213 that element termed ‘water’ were different (although the
214 observable properties were the same on Earth and Twin
215 Earth). Putnam’s (1975) claim was that, given identical
216 individuals on Earth and Twin Earth, when either spoke
217about ‘water’ they would be referring to something dif-
218ferent. This means that the intrinsic characteristics of these
219two identical individuals would not be sufficient to deter-
220mine the meaning of the word ‘water’, but that there needs
221to be some reference to external environment. This leads
222Putnam (1975) to make the well-known assertion that
223‘‘…meanings’ just ain’t in the head.’’ (p. 227).
224Relating this discussion to the earlier contrast between
225Sherlock Holmes and contemporary CSE, we could suggest
226that Holmes represents the application of ‘narrow’ content;
227the world and its machinations exist solely through his (or
228rather, Doyle’s) description of them and this description
229cannot be challenged (simply because the stories rarely
230include the opportunity to develop alternative explana-
231tions). In contrast, the CSE is involved in the application of
232‘broad’ content; the world is represented as evidence which
233is passed between different people who can offer different
234interpretations to bear on it. From this perspective, the
235question becomes a matter of how representations are used
236rather than a matter of individual interpretation (because
237these interpretations will always, in an adversarial legal
238system, be open to dispute).
2394 Distributing examination
240While Sherlock Holmes provides an entertaining version of
241logical analysis (and serves as a template for contemporary
242television equivalents), his approach has many differences
243with modern Crime Scene and Forensic Examination.
244Obviously, Crime Scene Examiners do not have the benefit
245of the omniscient author guiding the discovery and inter-
246pretation of evidence, nor do they have the opportunity to
247present their findings to an informal (usually incredulous)
248gathering of people, as could Holmes. More importantly,
249Holmes’s form of inductive reasoning requires the proba-
250bilistic elimination of competing hypotheses to explain a
251well-defined piece of evidence. The notion of a well-
252defined piece of evidence concerns the relationship
253between recognising something as having potential evi-
254dential value and the interpretation of that evidence in
255terms of other information. For Holmes (and his modern,
256fictional counterparts), this all takes place in the head of
257one person; so the processes are typically assumed to
258involve the mental states of a single individual.
259Crime Scene Examination can be considered ‘distrib-
260uted’, in a trivial sense, in that several people are involved
261in the interpretation of evidence, each providing a partic-
262ular perspective on this interpretation. What we see in
263Sherlock Holmes is a literary representation of the many-
264headed being of the criminal justice process in the body of
265a single individual. As crime scene examination grew
266increasingly ‘scientific’ so the division of tasks into
1FL01 1 This example follows the legal system in England and Wales; while
1FL02 other countries will follow different processes, the point is that several
1FL03 people are involved in the interpretation of evidence.
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267 discrete specialisms (each with a defined skill set) devel-
268 oped (Horswell 2004). Thus, it is typical for the Crime
269 Scene Examiner and Forensic Scientist to have followed
270 different career paths and have different skill sets (and,
271 furthermore, for there to be a growing variety of special-
272 isms within Forensic Science). Two further factors in the
273 ‘distribution’ of Crime Scene Examination arise from the
274 ‘civilianisation’ of CSE activity (the recruitment of per-
275 sonnel to this function from outside the Police Force) and
276 the establishment of specific CSE units (outside the oper-
277 ation of separate Police stations). Each of these factors can
278 be related to imperatives of economic and efficiency gains,
279 but they have a bearing on how knowledge of criminal
280 behaviour is shared and applied. For example, an under-
281 standing of criminal behaviour, gained over years of
282 policing, could help interpret evidence; but recruiting
283 civilian staff to these posts might remove the opportunity to
284 gain knowledge and experience from policing. This could
285 be dealt with through the training and exposure of new
286 CSE personnel, or through the integration of CSE activity
287 with other police activity. This relates to the second point,
288 namely the removal of a CSE from local police stations to
289 centralised services, which implies the need for a means of
290 sharing experiences and knowledge. Thus, if there is a set
291 of similar cases in an area (say a string of burglaries with
292 similar ways of gaining access to a building), then one
293 would expect a link to be made between them. However, if
294 each case is investigated by different individuals, then it
295 might not always be possible to explore such links.
296 What is happening in Crime Scene Examination is the
297 mediation of cognition through the collection, manipulation
298 and dissemination of a variety of artifacts; each artifact is
299 interpreted in particular ways by the agents who come into
300 contact with it. My argument will be that, for the various
301 agents involved in this evidence chain, each artifact can
302 ‘afford’ a particular set of responses, that is, the artifacts are
303 resources for action, and the actions will be recognised by
304 different agents according to their training and experience.
305 I am using the notion of ‘afford’ in the sense introduced by
306 Gibson (1977, 1979), as a form of perception–action cou-
307 pling in which the physical appearance of an object in the
308 world supports particular physical responses (e.g., a pebble
309 ‘affords’ grasping in the hand). Thus, the design of artefacts
310 that are used in a work environment become changed by
311 their use, and these changes provide cues for subsequent
312 use (Bang and Timpka 2003; Nemeth 2003; Seagull et al.
313 2003). What makes this a challenging domain for dis-
314 cussing Distributed Cognition is that the manipulation of an
315 artifact by one agent might have a significant bearing on the
316 state of the artifact, which could interfere with the activity
317 of other agents, e.g., a simple example would be the need to
318 preserve a crime scene so as to protect evidence from
319 contamination conflicting with the need to retrieve specific
320items of evidence, or the need to dust a surface to reveal
321fingermarks conflicting with the need to photograph the
322scene.
3235 Inspection and expectations
324In their study of Crime Scene Examination, Schraagen and
325Leijenhorst (2001) recorded verbal protocols of the
326examination of a staged crime scene. They suggested, for
327the analysis of these protocols, that the experienced Crime
328Scene Examiner develops a narrative of the crime, for
329example considering how a person might have gained
330access to the building, what path they might have followed,
331what actions they might have performed, etc. This narrative
332would probably be intertwined with the search activity,
333such that the narrative would influence the search and the
334search would influence the narrative. In a similar vein,
335Ormerod et al. (2008) suggest that ‘‘…expert investigators
336… [call] … upon internalized cognitive frames relating to
337human behaviour that allow them to generate expectations
338about the actions and responses of others in real time.’’
339[Ormerod et al. 2008, p. 82].
340In studies using ASL MobileEye, a head-mounted eye-
341tracking system, we asked Crime Scene Examiners to
342inspect a set of staged crime scene. In one study, we
343compared performance of three experienced Crime Scene
344Examiners and three Undergraduate students to search the
345same room under the same conditions. Of the many obvi-
346ous and striking differences between the two sets of
347recordings, we noted that the students had a tendency to
348search only around locations that they believed to have
349links with stolen items–and so their narrative was focused
350solely on the loss of objects. The Crime Scene Examiners
351had a far more detailed narrative to guide their search and,
352as the stills from one recording shown later illustrate, spent
353a substantial part of their time looking at the door and
354noting possible evidence that could be recovered, e.g.,
355blood stains near the latch, tool marks made by a chisel on
356the door frame, a footprint on the outside of the door.
357Discussion with the Crime Scene Examiners showed
358how experience played a key role in deciding where to look
359for evidence and how best to examine the scene. For vol-
360ume crime, the Crime Scene Examiner might walk the
361scene with the victim in the first instance, and then return to
362key locations to look for possible evidence. There was
363some debate as to what should be the first location to
364search. Standard practice might say that one begins with
365the Point of Entry and examines that thoroughly. In Fig. 1,
366the Point of Entry involved forcing an office door, possibly
367with a tool that had a sharp end, such as a chisel, which
368resulted in cuts around the latch. Fingermarks on the door
369could have been left during entry (or exit) and suggest that
AI & Soc
123
Journal : Large 146 Dispatch : 12-1-2010 Pages : 10
Article No. : 274
h LE h TYPESET
MS Code : Baber-vol25 h CP h DISK4 4
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
370 the entrant had cut the right thumb. Comparison between
371 experienced CSEs and the untrained Engineering students
372 with no experience of CSE work showed clear distinctions
373 in search pattern; whereas the students all walked into the
374 room without looking at the door, the CSEs all spent
375 around 20% of their total search time inspecting the door
376 before proceeding to the rest of the room. There are two
377 plausible explanations for this. The first is that this scene
378 (which had been staged to replicate an office break-in) had
379 conspicuous evidence on and around the door. However,
380 this evidence was not so conspicuous that the students
381 noticed it. The second is that the CSEs expect to find
382 evidence at Point of Entry and so attend to this in detail.
383 The CSEs, after the study, stated that this approach was
384 ‘intuitive’ and ‘just felt right’. In their discussion of intu-
385 ition in problem solving, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) noted
386 that ‘‘intuition is the product of deep situational involve-
387 ment and recognition of similarity…; [and becomes
388 expertise when] not only situations but also associated
389 decisions are intuitively understood.’’ (Dreyfus and
390 Dreyfus 1986, p. 18). This notion is analogous to Klein’s
391 notion of Recognition-Primed Decision-making (Klein
392 et al. 1986). In Recognition-Primed Decision-making
393 (RPD), one can infer three broad approaches that the
394 decision-maker might follow; (i) the situation is recognised
395 as ‘typical’ and an associated set of activities would be
396 brought to mind; (ii) the situation is defined in terms of
397 core features, each of which would be developed in terms
398 of (i); and (iii) the situation is unusual, and the person
399 might mentally explore alternative strategies prior to
400committing to a set of activities. This study, and discussion
401with the Crime Scene Examiners, implies that the situation
402was defined in terms of (ii), and that each aspect would be
403considered in terms of a set of activities. The Point of Entry
404was explored in terms of recoverable DNA, fingermarks,
405and toolmarks (possibly in this order because each might
406be considered to have different levels of permanence and
407need to be recovered quickly). In a similar manner, Flin
408et al. (2007) have suggested that operational policing
409involves recognition of situations and the subsequent
410elicitation of appropriate response scripts, so this example
411of CSE suggests a three-step process by which a set of
412‘typical situations’, such as Point of Entry, are used to
413guide search of a scene, which then leads to attention to
414items of potential evidential value, and then interpretation
415of these items. Thus, we could reverse Klein’s RPD to
416describe the activity of the CSE as Decision-Primed Rec-
417ognition. This is not a huge step in terms of Klein’s notion
418of RPD because it simply follows the perception–action
419cycle that RPD implies: The recognition of features in the
420environment are responded to in terms of decisions based
421on previous experience, and these decision, in turn, can
422help shape expectations of what to look for in the envi-
423ronment (and to help interpret what one is looking at).
424A second study concerned compared first students on a
425crime scene examination and forensics degree and experi-
426enced crime scene examiners. In one condition, there was a
427search of a ransacked office (again the scene was staged).
428Figure 2 shows a set of stills taken from an experienced
429Crime Scene Examiner opening the office door and
Fig. 1 Stills taken from mobile eye-tracker worn by Crime Scene Examiner inspecting a staged break-in (fixation indicated by cross in thick
circle)
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430 immediately noticing a black mark on the floor (a), closer
431 inspection indicates that this is a footwear mark (b) and,
432 during the course of subsequent searching a plastic bag is
433 found under a table and a pair of shoes found in the bag–the
434 shoes have a black substance on their sole and the tread
435 looks similar to that in the footwear mark (c). The scene
436 had been staged to look as if an opportunistic thief had
437 broken into the office and stolen money from a petty-cash
438 tin (which was left open on top of the desk). However, in a
439 twist in the scenario, we had staged the scene to actually
440 reflect an ‘insurance job’, that is, the office’s owner had
441 staged the crime to claim on his insurance for loss of cash,
442 personal possessions and some computing equipment.
443 Most of the evidence in the scene could have been used
444 to support the conclusion of an opportunistic crime, which
445 was the conclusion of all five students and two of the CSEs.
446 There were three crucial pieces of evidence which pointed
447 to the alternative conclusion (the shoes, as shown in Fig. 2;
448 the fact that the window looked to have been forced but
449 with no obvious evidence of it being used as a point of exit,
450 particularly as it was some 15’ off the ground; the order in
451 which the desk drawers had been opened
2).
452 The stills in Fig. 2 show an additional aspect of the
453 CSEs exploration of the scene. As well as being guided by
454 their experience of likely places to search for evidence,
455 they need to maintain a running commentary of recovered
456 evidence so as to be able to compare subsequent finds.
457 Interestingly, the two CSEs who did not link the shoes to
458 the footwear mark had previously dismissed the marks as
459 ‘smudged’ and ‘not worth recovering’. This implies that
460 the mark was no longer part of their running commentary,
461 and so the potential value of the shoes was not explored.
462 The question of how a ‘running commentary’ is developed
463 and indexed during a search activity could be worth further
464 investigation. Studies of Distributed Cognition demonstrate
465 ways in which objects-in-the-world structure cognition.
466Often these objects-in-the-world are purpose-built to sup-
467port specific cognitive activities, or are adapted from
468existing objects. Researchers would then either focus on
469the design of such objects, and their ability to support
470cognition or at ways in which activities result in the
471modification of objects. Crime Scene Examination repre-
472sents a special case, in that the objects-in-the-world to
473which the person attends have been neither designed nor
474adapted to suit a specific cognitive activity. Rather, the
475objects have to be discovered by the person and then
476interpreted in terms of their relevance to the task of gath-
477ering evidence. In this manner, the tasks of discovering
478objects-in-the-world that could have evidential value can
479be considered a form of recognition-primed decision-
480making.
4816 Evidence recovery
482As mentioned previously, one requirement of Crime Scene
483Examination is to select items that could be of evidential
484value. This means not only finding visible items, but also
485preparing surfaces so that less visible, or latent, items can
486be revealed. Figure 3, for instance, shows how a surface
487can be prepared to lift fingerprints. In this instance, the item
488being inspected (a glass bottle) is being dusted with alu-
489minium powder using a brush. The brush is applied to the
490item using a swirling motion to ensure a light, even cov-
491erage. The process involved a period of brushing (for
492around 10 s), followed by a visual check (for about 5 s in
493which the bottle was gently rotated to catch light falling on
494any revealed marks), and then a repeated period of
495brushing prior to the use of tape to lift the revealed marks
496(or, more recently, the use of high-resolution digital pho-
497tography to capture the marks) to transport them to the
498laboratory. In some instances, the visual check might be
499supplemented through the use of a handtorch which shone
500orthogonally to the powdered surface. In the inspection
501shown in Fig. 3, the torch was not used but the CSE could
502be seen to be rotating the bottle to catch available light
Fig. 2 Series of images from eye-tracking worn by experienced CSE inspecting a ransacked office
2FL01 2 In order to prevent one drawer obscuring the contents of the next,
2FL02 and in order to prevent the need to close drawers, the experienced
2FL03 criminal is likely to open drawers from the bottom up–but in this
2FL04 scene, we had obviously opened them top down.
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503 during the visual check phase. Concurrent verbal protocol
504 during the search suggested that the CSE initially con-
505 centrated on two areas that were anticipated to reveal
506 marks–and there was an assumption that each area would
507 reveal different types of mark. Around the neck of the
508 bottle, the search was initially for marks from fingertips
509 and thumb holding the bottle vertically (as if carrying it)
510 and around the middle of the bottle the search was for
511 marks of the bottle resting across the middle of the fingers
512 and being controlled by the thumb. Thus, a schema of how
513 the bottle could have been used influenced the initial
514 search.
515 While there are procedures in place for the recovery and
516 analysis of finger marks, work by Dror et al. (2005) high-
517 lights how their interpretation could be biased with the
518 provision of additional contextual information. In this
519 study, contextual factors were manipulated by the story and
520 photographs that were used to explain the source of the
521 fingerprints, for example crimes with no physical harm to
522 the person versus crimes with extreme physical harm. The
523 study showed that in cases where the fingerprints were
524 unambiguously different, there was little effect of context.
525 When the fingerprints were ambiguous, namely when the
526 certainty as to whether they were the same of different
527 decreased, then the contextual factors seemed to play a role
528 in increasing the likelihood of seeing a match. However,
529 this effect was only observed for the context in which
530 extreme physical harm featured in the background story.
531 The study suggests that in cases where there might be some
532 uncertainty as to whether fingerprints match and where the
533 crime is extreme, that matching might be influenced by
534 context. This also suggests that while the use of a narrative
535 to guide the collection of evidence might be beneficial, it
536 can also bias interpretation and, by implication, search.
537 This raises the potential (and, perhaps, often unexplored)
538 question of how recognition-primed decisions can become
539 biasing rather than supporting, particularly in terms of
540 expectancy bias. This also highlights the importance of
541 maintaining as neutral a description in crime scene reports
542 associated with recovered evidence as possible, and shows
543why the inductive approach is preferable for the CSE; even
544if the final ‘theory’ to which the evidence leads is not
545developed by the CSE but by other people in the criminal
546justice process.
5477 Evidence Sharing
548The preceding discussion implies that the search of a scene
549is guided by experience, expectation and the ability to
550recognise items of evidential value. In this respect, the
551notion of Distributed Cognition can be interpreted in terms
552of the use of objects in the world as resources-for-action.
553The Crime Scene Examiner recognises objects as resour-
554ces-for-action which may well differ from untrained
555observers. For example, while the untrained observer might
556assume that a pane of glass in a window could yield fin-
557germarks, they might be less inclined to immediately
558assume that it could also yield footwear marks, and still
559less inclined to recognise its potential for yielding DNA
560(the latter two could arise from someone climbing in
561through the window, or from pressing their forehead
562against the window to see if anyone is at home).
563So far, this description looks very much like a process
564that involves the mental states of an individual; the CSE
565interprets the scene, recognising objects as resources-for-
566action, and then recovers the evidence. However, what
567makes the Crime Scene Examination process different
568from a Sherlock Holmes story is that the CSE submits the
569evidence for interpretation by other people. Indeed, it is
570unlikely for the CSE’s notes and reports from the scene to
571include any deduction. Rather the report will be as
572descriptive as possible. This representation, of the scene
573and its evidence, is passed along the recovery train. So we
574have a set of processes that could ostensibly represent the
575stimulus (or input) to a cognitive processing system. This
576processing is (formally) undertaken by people other than
577the CSE.
578Once evidence has been recovered, it is placed in
579appropriate bags (or containers), labelled and passed on the
Fig. 3 Dusting for fingermarks
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580 Forensic Laboratory for further analysis. This step in the
581 process requires some means of maintaining accurate
582 records of who has handled the evidence, as well as the
583 accumulation of the results of analyses. This relates to a
584 point made earlier, that the ‘distributed’ nature of the
585 Crime Scene Examination process can make this process
586 somewhat disjointed, in that it is not uncommon for the
587 Forensic Scientist in the laboratory to have very little
588 information on the item recovered. One could make a
589 strong argument that this lack of information helps an
590 analysis to be as objective as possible, by focussing only on
591 the item at hand (and avoiding the potential for bias that
592 Dror et al. (2005) demonstrated). On the other hand, it
593 might be useful to have some knowledge of the item in situ,
594 so as to decide how best to conduct analysis. If the Forensic
595 Scientist had recovered the item herself then such infor-
596 mation would be recalled by her, but when it is delivered in
597 a batch of bags then such information is not obviously
598 available. As an example of why this could be problematic,
599 consider a finger-mark left on a window. This mark might
600 not be detailed enough to form a print, but could indicate
601 whether the window has been forced up or whether
602 someone climbed down the window, knowing the orien-
603 tation of the mark on the window can help decide how best
604 to analyse it, but this might not have been provided in the
605 evidence log.
606 8 Reporting and disclosure
607 In previous discussions of Crime Scene Examination,
608 Baber et al. (2006a, b) consider the manner in which nar-
609 ratives are passed through the evidence chain. The argu-
610 ment was that different people in the evidence chain
611 develop narratives (both formal and informal) that sum-
612 marise the key aspects of their interpretation of the events
613 and environment. Thus, a victim or witness might provide
614 an account of the events as they recall; although, of course,
615 the nature of eye-witness testimony is notoriously contra-
616 dictory and prone to error (Wells and Olson 2003). Each
617 account would develop a particular narrative, emphasising
618 the aspects that the witness feels was relevant, and attempt
619 to maintain an internal coherence and consistency (but
620 which might differ from other accounts). Interviewing of
621 suspects, in part, involves comparing different narratives
622 (from the suspect versus a synthesis of the witness state-
623 ments which maintains coherence and consistency). In this
624 context, the role of forensic evidence becomes merely a
625 tool to resolve any ambiguities in these accounts. However,
626 of course, forensic evidence has become increasingly sig-
627 nificant in investigations (to the extent that it is often given
628 priority over narratives because of its assumed objectivity
629 in comparison with the obvious subjectivity and potential
630for bias in the narratives). We propose that each step in the
631criminal justice process involves the production of narra-
632tive. There are the formal narratives that are structured by
633the reporting procedures and forms that are used to record
634investigations and analyses. This would lead to a set of
635reports, from Crime Scene Examiners and Forensic Sci-
636entists, which are written in a scientific style and which
637record details in as objective a manner as possible. Such
638narratives would then be subjected to scrutiny in Court in
639terms of the methods used to perform the analysis and the
640interpretation of the results. On the other hand, there are
641informal narratives that are passed on through discussion
642with agents involved in the investigation (say, between an
643attending officer and a victim, or between the attending
644officer and the crime scene examiner). These tend not to be
645recorded for several reasons. First, as discussed in the
646following paragraphs, Laws of Disclosure mean that any-
647thing which has a bearing on the case needs to be available
648to both Defence and Prosecution so as to maintain fairness
649and balance. Second, and perhaps more importantly, much
650of this informal narrative could be said to involve the
651development of formal narrative, e.g., an experienced
652attending officer might speak with a victim to calm or
653reassure them prior to taking a formal statement, and
654during this process the victim might have several partial
655accounts of what has happened but be seeking to reconcile
656this into a single.
657The final decision of the relevance of an item of evi-
658dence is made in Court during the hearing. However, an
659initial assessment will be made (in the UK) by the Crown
660Prosecution Service which will evaluate the evidence that
661is being presented in support of a case and decide whether
662it is suitable. This raises one of the key dilemmas in evi-
663dence recovery and relates to the Laws of Disclosure.
664Basically, these Laws of Disclosure state that anything that
665has been collected as part of the investigation can be made
666available to both Prosecution and Defence (even if it is not
667presented at Court). This raises two issues for this discus-
668sion. First, the adversarial nature of the Justice System (in
669the UK and many other countries) means that the ‘Dis-
670tributed Cognition’ involves not only cooperation and
671collaboration (in terms of several people contributing to a
672common goal) but also conflict (in terms of two parties
673attempting to prevent each other from achieving their
674goal). I am not sure that there are many other areas of
675distributed cognition research which come up against this
676problem (although, of course, one can imagine many
677examples from military and law enforcement). Second, the
678process often involves a number of different forms of
679analysis and interpretation. In Baber et al. (2006a, b), we
680referred to these forms as formal and informal narratives
681and suggested that there was a continual development of
682narratives, along several lines, over the course of an
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683 investigation and that very often these narratives might not
684 connect.
685 9 Conclusions
686 In this paper, I suggest that, for Crime Scene Examination,
687 cognition is distributed in three senses. First, there is the
688 distribution of attention between the activities involved in
689 searching, recovering and reporting. Second, there is the
690 distribution of cognition between CSE personnel and the
691 scene itself; the manner in which the scene is examined
692 provides hints and cues to what evidence to recover, and
693 interrupting this process (through the need to complete
694 lengthy reports) could disrupt this process. For this activity,
695 the environment and objects it contains become resource-
696 for-action that the experience and training of Crime Scene
697 Examiners allow them to interpret in ways which might be
698 different to that of the untrained observer. Furthermore, the
699 manner in which recovered items are passed from one
700 person to the next in the evidence chain can modify the role
701 of these items as resources-for-action; each step in the
702 process interprets the information from the previous step in
703 terms of additional knowledge and information. Third,
704 there is the distribution of information between CSE per-
705 sonnel and other people involved in the investigation. The
706 notion of formal and informal narrative, and their devel-
707 opment through the criminal justice process, sees these
708 narratives as additional resources-for-action.
709 A ‘weak’ view of the Distributed Cognition argument
710 might claim that what is being distributed is the collection
711 of objects upon which the act of cognition can be focused.
712 This would require objects-in-the-world to play a fairly
713 passive role in the process of cognition and for them to
714 function as vehicles for the storage or representation of
715 information. The artefacts allow users to off-load infor-
716 mation (Scaife and Rogers 1996) and also a record of
717 previous activity. In this version, the objects have their
718 states altered by the actions that their users perform on
719 them (e.g., through note-taking, folding or other markings).
720 Furthermore, not only do these objects provide a means of
721 recording and storing information, but their design affords
722 (or influences) the actions of the person using them.
723 A ‘strong’ view of Distributed Cognition posits that it is
724 the tasks involved in cognition which are being distributed.
725 One way in which the activity of the CSE differs from some
726 of these domains, is in the initial definition of objects-in-the-
727 world, and for these objects to be ‘revealed’ in order to be
728 recovered. This would regard the role of the CSE is primarily
729 one of induction, or rather, as one of providing the set of
730 alternatives upon which a process of induction could be
731 applied. I would suggest that the act of induction takes place
732 in the Court (or at least in the Crown Prosecution Service
733which decides whether a Case can be presented to Court).
734Prior to this act of induction, there are initial acts of
735deduction which are formally assigned to the Forensic Sci-
736entists, in their analysis and interpretation of evidence, but
737also informally applied by the CSE in the decision as to
738where to look and what to recover. In this view, one would
739expect agents and objects-in-the-world to bemore active and
740capable of either performing, or at least participating in,
741information processing tasks. For example, Hutchins
742(1995b) famously speaks about the ways in which the flight-
743crew and their instruments work together to monitor the
744speed at which an aircraft is flying; his assertion is that this
745knowledge does not reside in the head of one specific indi-
746vidual, but is derived from the collection of information that
747is available in the cockpit. Perhaps, a point to note here is
748that, ultimately, there needs to be some ‘cognizing entity’
749that is capable of combining the various bits of data into a
750coherent ‘whole’ and that this requires a set of mental
751capabilities that are uniquely human.
752Both views raise questions that relate to the manner in
753which cognition becomes a matter of sharing tasks. In
754terms of distributed cognition, the work reported in this
755paper covers both the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ views of dis-
756tributed cognition. From the ‘weak’ view, it is argued that
757the training, knowledge and experience of Crime Scene
758Examiners allow them to use the environment and the
759artefacts within it, together with the collection of narratives
760through the criminal justice process, as resources-for-
761action in a manner that might be alien to the non-expert. In
762this way, the Crime Scene Examiner will not only search
763for specific artefacts but also be able to identify locations
764which could yield non-visible materials (e.g., places to
765check for fingerprints, DNA and other evidence). The use
766of eye-tracking and verbal protocol from crime scene
767examination shows how the approach to searching a scene
768differs with experience. From the ‘strong’ view, the
769reporting and interpretation of evidence from a crime scene
770through the criminal justice process implies a collective
771activity (which might not be coordinated by a central
772agency) that accumulates information to a point at which
773its interpretation can be tested in Court. While neither
774approach should be taken to imply that mental states are
775distributed across individuals, both imply that the action of
776one individual will form the basis for actions of the next. In
777this manner, the criminal justice process is able to ‘know’
778the collected evidence, even though it is unlikely that a
779single individual will have access to all of the information
780collected during the examination.
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